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BALLEW v. GEORGIA: A MOVE TOWARD
NEO-INCORPORATIONISM?
When the Supreme Court held the sixth amendment guarantee of a
jury trial' applicable to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment,2 the Court did not decide whether state jury proce-
dures must conform to federal practice.' As a result, the states made juries
available to defendants accused of serious crimes, but continued to inter-
pret jury practice according to state constitutions and statutes.4 In
Williams v. Florida,' the Supreme Court upheld the use of a six memer
jury in a state criminal proceeding.' The Supreme Court, reasoning that a
six member jury is as capable of performing a jury's functions as a jury of
twelve,7 held that a jury of six complies with the sixth amendment guaran-
i "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Duncan held that the right to a jury trial
attaches when a defendant is accused of serious crimes. Id. at 154. Under Duncan, a crime
that carried a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment was considered a serious crime.
Id. at 161-62. Since Duncan, the Supreme Court has extended the right to a jury trial to any
defendant accused of a crime that carries a maximum penalty exceeding six months imprison-
ment. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970).
3 Prior to Duncan, the sixth amendment right to a jury trial was not applicable to the
states. Therefore, defendants acquired jury rights in state criminal proceedings solely through
state constitutions and statutes. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 604-05 (1900)
(provision in state constitution for eight member juries in trials for noncapital offenses up-
held). In extending the right to a jury trial to state criminal proceedings, the Duncan Court
examined only a defendant's right to a jury trial, and did not impose a size requirement on
state court juries. 391 U.S. at 158 n.30.
See, e.g., Hearns v. State, 223 So. 2d 738, 739 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929
(1970) (six member jury constitutional; sixth amendment guarantees jury trial only and not
specific number of jurors).
399 U.S. 78 (1970).
Id. at 103. In reaching its decision, the Williams Court reasoned that the requirement
that a jury be composed of twelve persons was an historical accident. Id. at 87-90. Jury size
stabilized at 12 with the recognitions under Henry II. The recognitions were groups formed
by the courts to examine the facts of a case and report their verdict to the court. Thayer,
The Jury and Its Development, 5 HARv. L. Rav. 295, 295 (1892). Various rationales have
been suggested for a twelve member jury. The number always has had religious significance
(12 apostles, 12 tribes of Israel), and the English measurement system is based on 12 (12
inches in a foot, 12 items in a dozen). White, Origin And Development Of Trial By Jury,
29 TENN. L. Rav. 8, 15-17 (1961). One commentator has suggested that a jury of 12 has astro-
logical significance. See Wiehl, The Six Man Jury, 4 GONZ. L. Rav. 35, 38 (1968) (12 signs in
the Zodiac) [hereinafter cited as Wiehl].
After finding that a jury of twelve was an historical accident, the Williams Court con-
cluded that the Constitution does not require that juries be composed of twelve members.
399 U.S. at 99. But see The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 165-66 (1970)
(lack of debate by Framers, Congress and states in adopting sixth amendment suggests intent
to retain common law jury of 12).
1 399 U.S. at 100. The Williams Court reasoned that the jury's purpose is the prevention
of government oppression. This purpose can be achieved only when the jury is large enough
to promote group deliberation without external influence and to provide the possibility of
obtaining a representative cross-section of the community. Id. In examining the constitu-
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tee.' The constitutionality of using juries with less than six members re-
mained in doubt until Ballew v. Georgia.9
In Ballew, the Supreme Court found that the reduction of a jury to five
members impairs a jury's ability to fulfill its constitutional purpose and
thus held the use of five member juries in state criminal proceedings un-
constitutional.'" Ballew was charged with a misdemeanor for violating
Georgia's obscenity statute." After the trial court denied Ballew's motion
to impanel a jury of twelve,'2 Ballew was convicted by a jury of five.'3 On
tional sufficiency of six member juries, the Williams Court rejected the argument that a
reduction in jury size decreases the protection against government oppression by increasing
the prosecution's advantage over the defendant. Id. at 101-02. The Court agreed that a twelve
member jury is more likely than a six member jury to contain one juror sympathetic to the
defendant, thereby causing a hung jury rather than a conviction. However, the Court rea-
soned that a twelve member jury is also more likely to contain one juror sympathetic to the
prosecutor, thereby causing a hung jury rather than an acquittal. Id. at 101. Furthermore,
although a hung jury may be advantageous to the defendant, the Court did not believe that
a reduction in jury size to six perceptibly decreases the likelihood of a hung jury. Id. at 101
& n.47.
Id. at 102-03. The Court relied on six articles in deciding that there would be no
discernable difference in the verdicts reached by six and twelve member juries. Id. at 101 &
n.48, citing Cronin, Six Member Juries in District Courts, 2 BOSTON B.J. No. 4, 27 (1958);
Phillips, A Jury Of Six In All Cases, 30 CONN. B.J. 354 (1956) (reduction to six in all trials
except capital crimes would save time and expense and reduce court congestion); Tamm, The
Five Man Civil Jury: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 51 GEO. L. J. 120 (1962) (pro-
posed five member jury would decrease trial time, administrative time and costs while retain-
ing the advantages of the jury system); Wiehl, supra note 6, at 40-41 (jury of six would
perform as well as 12 member jury and would provide representative cross-section of the
community while being less costly and time consuming); New Jersey Experiments with Six-
Man Jury, 9 BULL. SEC. JuD. AD. A.B.A. (May 1966); Six-Member Juries Tried in Massachu-
setts District Court, 42 J. AM Jun. Soc. 136 (1958) (attorneys and court clerk perceived no
difference in verdicts, and a reduction in costs and backlog after using six member juries for
one and a half years).
In examining the ability of six member juries to provide a representative cross-section
of the community, the Williams Court furthdr reasoned that there would be little practical
difference between the cross-section provided by six and twelve member juries. 399 U.S. at
102. The Court reasoned that if the jury rolls do not exclude particular classes, six member
juries would meet the cross-section requirement. Id., citing Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S.
320, 329-30 (1970).
- 435 U.S. 223 (1978). The Williams Court reserved ruling on whether a jury smaller than
six could satisfy the jury requirement of the sixth amendment. 399 U.S. at 91 n.28.
"0 435 U.S. at 239.
1 Id. at 225. Ballew was the manager of an adult movie theater which presented the film
"Behind the Green Door." Id. at 224. Georgia's applicable obscenity statute provided: "A
person commits the offense of distributing obscene materials when he. . .exhibits or other-
wise disseminates to any person any obscene material of any description, knowing the obscene
nature thereof. . . ." GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2101(a) (1977).
12 435 U.S. at 227.
" Id. Since the maximum penalty for a misdemeanor exceeded six months imprison-
ment, the right to jury attached. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1970). Ballew
was tried in a county court which used five member juries for all misdemeanor trials pursuant
to statutory authority. 435 U.S. at 226; see 1890-91 Ga. Laws 937-38. The number of jurors
required by statute subsequently was change to six. See 1976 Ga. Laws, Vol. 2, No. 1003, at
3019. In addition, the Georgia Constitution in effect at the time Ballew was tried provided
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appeal, Ballew questioned the constitutionality of a five member jury,1
4
but the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction,'5 relying. on a
Georgia Supreme Court decision upholding the use of five member juries.'6
Because Williams approved the use of six member juries in state crimi-
nal proceedings," the issue in Ballew concerned the constitutional effect
of a reduction in jury size by one member.'8 Although the Court did not
reach a majority decision in Ballew, the Justices agreed that a jury of five
is constitutionally insufficient.'9 Justice Blackmun, writing the plurality
opinion," based his conclusion on several empirical jury studies that indi-
cated that a reduction in jury size from twelve to six members impairs the
jury's deliberative process.2 ' Justice Blackmun, however, did not scrutinize
the methodologies of the studies which supported his position,2 nor did he
explicitly recognize that the conclusions of such studies question the valid-
ity of Williams. 2
The studies relied upon by Justice Blackmun indicate that juries
smaller than twelve4 are less likely to foster group deliberation than twelve
that "[tihe right of trial by jury, except where otherwise provided in this Constitution, shall
remain inviolate, but the General Assembly may prescribe any number, not less than five,
to constitute a trial or traverse jury, except in the supreme court." GA. CONST. of 1945 art. 6,
§ 16, 1. Despite the 1976 statutory change requiring a minimum of six jurors, the state
constitution adopted in 1976 retained the same jury provision. GA. CONsT. art. 6, § 15, 1.
" Ballew v. State, 138 Ga. App. 530, 535, 227 S.E.2d 65, 69 (1976).
is Id. at 536, 227 S.E.2d at 69.
6 See Sanders v. State, 234 Ga. 586, 216 S.E.2d 838 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 931
(1976).
' 399 U.S. at 103; see text accompanying notes 5-8 supra.
' 435 U.S. at 230-31.
"Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, agreed that a five member
jury is not allowed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments, but would have held Georgia's
obscenity statute unconstitutonal. Id. at 246. Justice White asserted that a five member jury
is unconstitutional due to its inability to represent a cross-section of the community. Id. at
245. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, recognized that a
minimum jury size must be established and stated that a trial by a jury of five was potentially
unfair to the accused. Justice Powell also argued that state and federal jury practice are not
required to be identicial; therefore, the approval of six member juries in state criminal
proceedings does not imply approval of a similar federal jury size. Id. at 245-46.
Only Justice Stevens joined Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion. Id. at 224.
2 Id. at 232-38. Justice Blackmun cited Williams as precedent for the use of empirical
studies as a basis for a constitutional decision. Id. Justice Powell, however, in his concurring
opinion, criticized Justice Blackmun's reliance on such studies since their validity was not
subjected to the "traditional testing mechanisms of the adversary process." Id. at 246.
" See text accompanying notes 42-47 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 76-79 infra.
24 Since most of the jury studies were undertaken to test the validity of Williams, they
generally compare juries of six and twelve. See, e.g., Lempert, Uncovering "Non-discernable"
Differences: Empirical Research And The Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. Rav. 643 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Lempert]; Zeisel, . . . And Then There Were None: The Diminution
of the Federal Jury, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 710 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Zeisel]; Note, Six-
Member And Twelve-Member Juries: An Empirical Study Of Trial Results, 6 U. MICH. J. L.
REF. 671 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Trial Results]; Note, An Empirical Study of Six- And
Twelve-Member Jury Decision-Making Processes, 6 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 712 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Decision Process]; Note, The Effect of Jury Size on the Probability of
19791
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member juries.? In smaller juries, individual jurors make fewer critical
contributions, 2 and individual prejudices are more difficult to overcome.,
Justice Blackmun also cited studies showing that the use of smaller juries
increases the risk of convicting innocent defendants and results in a wider
range of verdicts.2 9 Therefore, Justice Blackmun believed that the verdicts
rendered by smaller juries are less accurate and consistent than verdicts
rendered by twelve member juries. 0 In addition, Justice Blackmun exam-
ined a five member jury's ability to comply with the cross-section require-
ment.3' The low probability of minority representation on six member
juries32 convinced him that a reduction to five would further decrease the
opportunity for minority participation.? Finally, Justice Blackmun rea-
soned that because of an expected decrease in the number of hung juriese
and in minority representation,35 a reduction from six to five gives the
prosecution an overall advantage without offering any counterbalancing
Conviction: An Evaluation of Williams v. Florida, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 529 (1971). But
see, e.g., H. KALvN & H. ZE.SEL, THE AMERicAN JuRy (Phoenix ed. 1971) (comparing verdicts
reached by 12 member juries with verdict judge would have rendered! [hereinafter cited as
KALViN & ZmsmL]; Nagel & Neef, Deductive Modeling To Determine An Optimum Jury Size
And Fraction Required To Convict, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 933 (attempt to ascertain optimum
jury size through probability theory) [hereinafter cited as Nagel & Neefl.
25 435 U.S. at 232-34; see Thomas & Fink, Effects of Group Size, 60 PSYCH. BULL. 371,
373 (1963) (comparison of various size groups showed positive correlation between size, group
performance and productivity).
435 U.S. at 233; see Faust, Group Versus Individual Problem-Solving, 59 J. ABNORMAL
& SOC. PSYCH. 68, 71 (1959) (larger group is more likely than smaller group to remember
details such as evidence and jury instructions).
7 435 U.S. at 233; see Barnlund, A Comparative Study of Individual, Majority and
Group Judgment, 58 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 55, 59 (1959) (in larger groups, individual
prejudices are more often counterbalanced by viewpoints of other group members).
21 435 U.S. at 234; see Nagel & Neef, supra note 24, at 960 (probability of convicting
innocent defendant increases seven per cent when jury size decreases from twelve to six).
1 435 U.S. at 235; see Lempert, supra note 24, at 679-80 (jury of 12 more likely to reach
consistent compromises in resolving multiple counts or levels of offense than jury of six).
" 435 U.S. at 234-35. Justice Blackmun also cited a mock trial experiment which indi-
cated a 14% decrease in correct verdicts when jury size decreased from twelve to six. Id.;
see M. SAKS, JuRY VERDICTs, 86-87 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SAKs, VERmcrS].
1' 435 U.S. at 236-37, 241-42; see note 7 supra.
12 A minority comprising 10% of a community would be unrepresented on 28.2% of
randomly selected twelve member juries and 53.1% of randomly selected six member juries.
435 U.S. at 236; Lempert, supra note 24, at 669.
3 435 U.S. at 236-37; see text accompanying notes 50-59 infra.
3 435 U.S. at 236; see Zeisel, supra note 24, at 720 (percent of hung juries decrease from
5% to 2.4% with reduction in jury size from twelve to six). A defendant benefits from a hung
jury because he remains unconvicted pending another trial, is in a better position to plea
bargain because the weaknesses of a case have been exposed, and the prosecution's evidence
against him has been fully disclosed. Lempert, supra note 24, at 667.
31 435 U.S. at 236; see note 32 supra. Often an unconvinced juror will join the majority
in voting for acquittal or conviction unless he is supported by another juror who shares his
viewpoint. Furthermore, hung juries are usually caused by only one or two hold out jurors.
Therefore, as jury size is reduced, the likelihood of a jury containing two jurors who express
minority opinions is also reduced, thus decreasing the number of hung juries. 435 U.S. at 356;
see Lempert, supra note 24, at 673-77.
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safeguards for the defendant." Justice Blackmun cited the results of the
empirical studies to support his conclusion that a reduction in jury size to
five members is unconstitutional under the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments because such a reduction impairs, to a constitutionally significant
degree, a jury's ability to function.37
Not all jury studies, however, support Justice Blackmun's conclusion
that jury deliberation and accuracy are adversely affected by a size reduc-
tion. Two mock trial experiments and a study comparing actual trial
verdicts" concluded that there are no significant differences between ver-
dicts, deliberation times, and deliberative processes of juries of twelve and
six.4" Rejecting such conclusions, Justice Blackmun criticized the metho-
dologies employed in these studies.'
While Justice Blackmun criticized the methodologies of studies that
undermined his position, 2 he cited without scrutiny the conclusions of
other studies to assert that a reduction in jury size affects a small percen-
tage of verdicts. 3 By not considering the inherent difficulty in assessing the
effect of a size reduction on jury behavior,4 Justice Blackmun failed to
= 435 U.S. at 236.
v Id. at 239.
38 Davis, Kerr, Atken, Holt & Meek, The Decision Processes of 6- and 12-Person Mock
Juries Assigned Unanimous and Two-thirds Majority Rules, 32 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCH.
1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Davis]; Decision Process, supra note 24, at 712.
" Trial Results, supra note 24, at 671.
14 Davis, supra note 38, at 7; Decision Process, supra note 24, at 716-18; Trial Results,
supra note 24, at 710.
41 435 U.S. at 237-39, 242-43, citing Diamond, A Jury Experiment Reanalyzed, 7 U.
MICH. J. L. REF. 520 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Diamond]; Zeisel & Diamond, "Convincing
Empirical Evidence" on the Six Member Jury, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 281 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Zeisel & Diamond]. The facts presented in both mock trial experiments were so
heavily biased in favor of one party that all juries, regardless of size, reached the same verdict.
435 U.S. at 243; see Diamond, supra at 521-22; Zeisel & Diamond, supra at 287. In one
experiment, only three out of sixteen jury panels reached verdicts through deliberation. The
examination of the deliberative processes of only three panels cannot support any inferences
regarding the general behavior of juries because the sample is too small. Zeisel & Diamond,
supra at 287-88. Other methodological problems result because the juries in the mock trials
were composed of students. Davis, supra note 38, at 5; Decision Process, supra note 24, at
721. Students are less likely to spend as much time deliberating than actual jurors, because
students are aware of their participation in an experiment and must return to other classes.
Diamond, supra at 522-23.
Another study compared actual jury results in civil cases before and after jury size was
reduced from twelve to six. See Trial Results, supra note 24, at 657. Although the study
concluded that there was no significant difference in the damages awarded by six and twelve
member juries, critics have argued that such a conclusion was unsupported by the study's
data. See Zeisel & Diamond, supra at 288-90. In addition, because the study dealt only with
civil cases, its applicability to criminal juries is questionable. Id.
11 See note 41 supra.
13 435 U.S. at 234.35, citing SAKs, VFaicrs, supra note 30, at 86-87; Lempert, supra note
24, at 648-53. In citing the Saks experiment, Justice Blackmun did not examine the methodol-
ogy employed as he did when he rejected the conclusions of other mock trial experiments.
Compare 435 U.S. at 234-35 with id. at 242-43.
" Researchers generally agree that a size reduction affects only a small percent of jury
1979]
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recognize the weaknesses of the studies supporting his position .5 Research-
ers have concluded from such studies that group deliberation is adversely
affected as size is reduced. However, the magnitude of the adverse effect
resulting from a reduction in jury size to either six or five has not been
measured." Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun considered the conclusions of
such research an adequate indication that a reduction in jury size from
twelve to six adversely affects the reliability of jury verdicts by impairing
the jury's deliberative process. He then concluded that a reduction to a five
member jury would have a constitutional effect on a jury's reliability. 7
Even if five member juries were sufficiently large to promote group
deliberation, 8 juries also must provide the possibility of obtaining a repre-
sentative cross-section of the community." In testing the ability of a five
member jury to comply with the cross-section requirement, Justice Black-
mun was concerned that juries smaller than six could not adequately repre-
sent the community. 0 The small mathematical probability of minority'
verdicts. See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 24, at 648-53. For this reason, Lempert questioned
the ability of any experiment to reflect differences caused only by size. Id. at 653.
,1 Researchers utilize four major methods of studying the effect of size on jury behavior:
mock trials, comparisons of trial results conducted before different sized juries, mathematical
models and group decision making experiments. In mock trial experiments, different sized
panels are presented with a fact situation, and the panels deliberate and return their verdicts.
See, e.g., SAKS, VuRc'rs, supra note 30, at 86-97; Davis, supra note 38, at 7; Decision Process,
supra note 24, at 716-18. Because such experiments are dissimilar from actual trials in the
manner of presentation and the motivation of the jurors, the study of size and its effect on
jury behavior is difficult. Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 41, at 287-88.
Comparisons of actual trial verdicts have been attempted. See, e.g., Trial Results, supra
note 24, at 671. The validity of such studies is hampered by the difficulty of obtaining
comparable data. Community attitudes, court procedures and inflation may contribute to
any verdict difference as well as the size reduction. Nagel & Neef, supra note 24, at 936.
Furthermore, such studies, which compare jury behavior in civil trials, have questionable
relevance to criminal juries. See Lempert, supra note 24, at 290.
Because of the difficulty in isolating size as a factor in jury deliberation and verdicts,
Nagel and Neef constructed a mathematical model to clarify the relationship between jury
size, the probability of convicting innocent defendants and the probability of acquitting
guilty defendants. Nagel & Neef, supra note 24, at 938. Although they concluded that the
probability of convicting the innocent defendant increases as jury size decreases, they made
no assertions regarding the magnitude of the increase. Id. at 975. Rather, the magnitude
depends on the assumption of the number of truly guilty defendants. If most defendants are
in fact guilty, a size reduction would have little affect on the accuracy of verdicts. Id. at 963.
Finally, psychological studies of group deliberation and problem-solving have been ex-
amined for their relevance to the jury size question. Such studies show that larger groups are
superior to smaller groups in both quality and productivity. Thomas & Fink, supra note 25,
at 373. However, since these studies did not examine juries, groups of twelve were not com-
pared with groups of five or six. Nor were the decisions faced by such groups comparable to
the decisions faced by a jury. Lempert, supra note 24, at 667, 686.
" One commentator concluded that it is impossible to infer from empirical studies the
extent of any advantage to the defendant of a jury of twelve over a jury of six. See Lempert,
supra note 24, at 689.
435 U.S. at 239.
See text accompanying notes 24-47 supra.
' 435 U.S. at 230; see note 7 supra.
435 U.S. at 237.
[Vol. XXXVI
BALLEW v. GEORGIA
representation on a six member jury12 convinced Justice Blackmun that a
reduction in jury size to five would impair to a constitutional degree the
opportunity for minority participation on a jury." However, the mathe-
matical probability of minority representation on a jury of any size has
little relationship to either the cross-section requirement as interpreted by
the Supreme Court" or to the likelihood of minority representation on an
actual jury." Justice Blackmun's analysis of the cross-section requirement,
which concentrates on the effect of a size reduction on minorities repre-
sented on each jury rather than on minority participation in the entire jury
system, could be interpreted as requiring actual minority representation
on each jury." Constitutional rights and practical difficulties, however,
make such an intepretation improbable."
The practical effect of challenges during jury selection proceedingss5 on
' Justice Blackmun used the term "minority" to refer to viewpoints as well as racial
groups. See 435 U.S. at 242.
2 See note 32 supra.
435 U.S. at 236-37, 241-42.
See note 57 infra.
See text accompanying notes 58-61 infra.
Justice Blackmun cited Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 136 (1940), for the proposition
that juries must be truly representative of the community to comply with the Constitution.
435 U.S. at 237, 243. He then questioned a five member jury's ability to meet such a require-
ment. Id. Smith, however, concerned the participation of all members of the community in
the jury process. See 311 U.S. at 129. Therefore, the argument could be made that Justice
Blackmun is trying to extend the. Smith holding to include the requirement 'of cross-
representation on each jury.
17 The cross-section requirement has two constitutional sources: the right to jury provi-
sion of the sixth amendment and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court has interpreted the equal protec-
tion clause to forbid the states from excluding protected classes from the jury selection
process. See, e.g., Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 284-85 (1947). When the Supreme Court
applied the sixth amendment right to a jury trial to the states in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968), the affirmative duty to provide a cross-representative jury venire, previously
required only in federal courts, also became applicable to the states. Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). Individual trialjuries, however, have never been required to repre-
sent a cross-section of the community. E.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1880).
The Supreme Court has specifically ruled that a defendant has no right to actual minority
representation on his jury. E.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
In addition, the number of protected classes entitled to participate in the jury process
has been greatly expanded in recent years. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)
(women); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (Mexican-Americans); United States v.
Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970) (young adults); Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967) (day laborers). Such an expansion limits the practical
ability of each jury to contain either a representative of each class or proportional cross-
representation of the community. Even if juries were forced to contain an economic or racial
cross-section of the community, there would be no way to insure that such juries would also
contain a cross-section of ideologies. See LaRue, A Jury Of One's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 841, 873-75 (1976). Therefore, the cross-section requirement is satisfied when the jury
venire properly represents the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 538.
Once presented with a jury venire, the prosecution and defense are each entitled to
challenge prospective jurors for cause if a juror shows actual prejudice or an interest in the
trial's outcome. Each side also is entitled to a specific number of peremptory challenges where
1979]
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actual minority representation was not considered by Justice Blackmun.51
Challenges, designed to give effect to the sixth amendment guarantee of
an impartial jury, 0 may limit actual minority representation on a jury.'
Thus, although Justice Blackmun's opinion could be read as support for
critics of the challenge system, 2 his purpose in citing the mathematical
probability of minority representation was not criticism of jury selection
procedures. Rather, his use of statistical probability was an attempt to
support empirically his belief that a jury of five is too small to reflect
community values.
3
Although Justice Blackmun's reference to the mathematical probabil-
ity of minority representation does illustrate that a jury of six is less likely
to reflect community values than a larger jury," Blackmun's reliance on
mathematical probability is not entirely justified. 5 Nevertheless, recogniz-
ing that a jury of six cannot represent the essence of the community as well
as a jury of twelve, Justice Blackmun concluded that a reduction of jury
size to five members decreases to a constitutionally significant degree a
jury's ability to constitute a cross-section of the community. 6 Therefore,
in Ballew, the use of five member juries was held unconstitutional because
a five member group is not large enough to foster group deliberation or to
represent the community.
Despite the concurring Justices' reservations concerning Justice Black-
mun's heavy reliance on empirical data," Blackmun expressed his belief
that such studies provide the "only basis" for deciding whether a five
member panel can fulfill a jury's purpose and functions.6 Although Justice
Blackmun cited the studies as an indication that a five member jury is not
constitutionally capable of fostering group deliberation or properly repre-
senting the community," the studies could have been cited to support the
conclusion that a jury of five is as capable as a jury of six. Jury studies
have attempted to compare the functioning and accuracy of juries of
bias need not be proven. See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 139-40, 143-45 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as VAN DYKE].
11 435 U.S. at 236-37, 241-42.
See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965). The Swain Court reasoned that
the purpose of peremptory challenges is the elimination of extremes of partiality, thereby
insuring that a case is decided solely on the merits. Id.
, See VAN DYKE, supra note 58, at 139.
02 Some commentators have argued that the use of peremptory challenges should be
restricted or curtailed because they tend to decrease minority representation on trial juries.
See, e.g., VAN DYKE, supra note 58, at 222.
435 U.S. at 242.
I, d. at 236-37.
See text accompanying notes 54-57 supra.
66 435 U.S. at 237. In a concurring opinion, Justice White concluded, without reference
to empirical data, that a jury smaller than six cannot represent the sense of the community.
Id. at 245 (White, J., concurring).
', Id. at 239; see note 7 supra; text accompanying notes 25, 50-53 supra.
See notes 19 & 21 supra.




twelve with juries of six, 71 but the results are inconclusive. If a difference
exists between the verdicts reached by different sized juries, its extent and
effect have not been measured. Since researchers have not examined five
member juries,72 any difference between six and five member juries in
deliberation or accuracy is largely a matter of conjecture. 73 Thus, despite
Justice Blackmun's claim that his decision was based on empirical re-
search, his interpretation of the studies suggests that his conclusion, like
those of the concurring Justices, was based on judicial hunch. Yet, unlike
the other Justices, Blackmun felt compelled to support his hunch with
empirical data.
74
The impetus for citing empirical data was undoubtedly the Williams
decision. The Williams Court has been criticized repeatedly for failing to
draw on empirical data for its conclusion that a jury of six can perform the
jury's functions as well as a jury of twelve.75 By citing research on jury size,
Justice Blackmun attempted to give scientific support for his opinion and,
thus, to avoid the criticism leveled at Williams.
Despite Justice Blackmun's apparent desire to support his opinion with
empirical evidence, his use of such data indicates his unwillingness to rely
fully on the conclusions of such studies. Justice Blackmun interpreted the
jury studies he cited as suggesting that a jury size reduction to six impairs
a jury's ability to deliberate and to represent the community.78 Rather than
concluding that six member juries do not comply with the sixth amend-
ment guarantee of a trial by jury, however, Justice Blackmun specifically
reaffirmed Williams 7  and stated that a reduction in jury size to five mem-
bers is unconstitutional. 7 Furthermore, he gave no explicit reason for his
inconsistent use of the studies. If he believed that the studies, in fact, show
an impairment of jury functions as a result of the reduction to six, a
reassessment of Williams would have been in order.79 The reaffirmation
of the Williams decision despite the citation of studies criticizing the wis-
dom of that decision suggests the presence of other factors which override
the potential adverse affects of the six member jury. The basis of Williams
may have been the belief that the use of six member juries would save
money and court time, thus reducing delay caused by crowded court dock-
71 See note 24 supra.
7 Id.
7 Justice Blackmun reasoned in Ballew that the reduction in jury size from six to five
seriously impairs the functioning of a jury. 435 U.S. at 239.
71 None of the concurring Justices cited empirical research to support their conclusions.
435 U.S. at 245-46.
7s The studies cited in Williams were based on opinions rather than empirical data. See,
e.g., Saks, Ignorance Of &ience Is No Excuse, 10 TRIAL, No. 6, at 18 (1974); Zeisel, The
Waning of the American Jury, 58 A.B.A.J. 367, 368 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Zeisel-
Waning].
76 435 U.S. at 239.
'Id.
79 Id.
11 The issue in Ballew was the constitutional sufficiency of the use of five member juries.
435 U.S. at 228. Justice Blackmun, therefore, could have reserved ruling on the continued
validity of Williams.
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ets.' Although the Williams Court did not explicitly consider the savings
resulting from a jury size reduction,8 ' in Ballew, Justice Blackmun was
willing to balance the negative effect of a reduction against the state's
interest in the reduction."2 This willingness suggests that the same consid-
erations may have affected the Williams decision.3
Both Ballew and Williams arose because state jury procedures did not
conform to federal jury standards.8 4 Since the Court had decided previously
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment incorporates the
right to jury provision of the sixth amendment," the issue in Williams was
the effect of that incorporation.8 In earlier decisions the Court followed the
selective incorporation doctrine, whereby an incorporated provision sub-
jects the states to the procedural standards imposed on the federal govern-
ment. 7 An alternative to selective incorporation is neo-incorporation.
Under neo-incorporation, the states may develop their own procedures to
give effect to an incorporated right.88 In Williams, the Supreme Court
approved the use of six member juries in state courts by construing the
sixth amendment.8 Although the Williams analysis is in keeping with the
- See, e.g., Zeisel-Waning, supra note 75, at 370; Comment, Defendant's Right to a Jury
Trial-Is Six Enough?, 59 Ky. L. J. 996, 1007-08 (1971).
m, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100-02.
N1 435 U.S. at 243-44. Justice Blackmun indicated that he might have allowed a jury
reduction to five if Georgia had been able to justify the reduction by showing a significant
saving in time or costs. While the use of six member juries could benefit the state by a sub-
stantial reduction in daily allowances paid to jurors, savings in court time have not been
documented. Id., citing Pabst, Statistical Studies Of The Costs Of Six-Man Versus Twelve-
Man Juries, 14 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 326, 327-28 (1972); Zeisel, Twelve Is Just, 10 TRIAL,
No. 6, at 13 (1974). From these studies, Justice Blackmun reasoned that minimal savings
would result were jury size reduced from six to five. Therefore, Georgia could not justify a
reduction and Justice Blackmun found the use of five member juries unconstitutional. 435
U.S. at 244-45.
The underlying rationale of Williams also might have been the desire of the Court not
to infringe upon the states. See Comment, Trial By Jury Under the Sixth
Amendment-Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), 5 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 278, 284 (1970).
When the Supreme Court decided Williams, eight states provided for six member juries in
some circumstances. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. at 139-41 (Appendix to Opinion of
Harlan, J., concurring). By 1977, 32 states had provisions for less than twelve member juries.
E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-82 (West Supp. 1978) (jury of 12 for crimes punishable by
death or life imprisonment only); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 913.10 (West 1973) (jury of 12 for capital
offenses only); IDAHO CODE § 2-105 (Supp. 1978) (jury of 12 unless misdemeanor). See also
VAN DYKE, supra note 58, at 286-89. The same day the Supreme Court decided Williams, the
right to a jury trial was extended to any defendant accused of a crime carrying a maximum
penalty in excess of six months imprisonment. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). If
the potential infringement on the states were a factor in the Williams decision, the same
considerations supported the reaffirmation of Williams by Ballew.
" In federal courts, juries of twelve are required. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b); see note 3 supra.
" See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
" Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 87 (1970).
17 See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969); Cord, Neo-Incorporation: The
Burger Court And The Due Process Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment, 44 FORDHAM L.
REv. 215, 229-32 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Cord].
" See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 211 (Fortas, J., concurring). See also Cord,
supra note 87, at 238.
11 399 U.S. at 87-104.
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selective incorporation approach," the issue in Williams was the constitu-
tionality of state juries containing six members. A narrow reading of both
Ballew and Williams, therefore, would allow six member juries in state
criminal trials while maintaining the requirement of twelve member juries
in federal criminal trials. The Ballew opinion is instructive also because,
despite the willingness of the Court to hold five member juries unconstitu-
tional, the Justices could not agree on the rationale for the decision.
The split of the Court in Ballew is indicative of the diverging constitu-
tional philosophies of the Justices ot the Burger Court." In some decisions,
the Burger Court has evinced a tendency to construe Bill of Rights guaran-
tees more narrowly than did the Warren Court.2 Should such a trend
continue, a reduction of federal jury standards may be held constitu-
tional. 3 However, the Burger Court also has shown a willingness to allow
states to utilize jury procedures which are not permitted in federal
courts.9 Following this trend, the Court may continue to require twelve
See generally Cord, supra note 87, at 229-32.
Of the Justices taking part in Ballew, Justices Powell, Rehnquist and Chief Justice
Burger clearly indicated their support for separate state and federal jury standards. See 435
U.S. at 245-46 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun's willingness to balance sixth
amendment rights against possible savings to the states indicates his willingness to approve
separate standards. See id. at 243-44; note 82 supra. Although their concurring opinions in
Ballew do not clarify their positions, Justices Brennan and Marshall have indicated elsewhere
their adoption of the selective incorporation approach. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,
795 (1969); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 154 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although
some commentators have asserted that Justice White is a neo-incorporationist, see, e.g.,
Cord, supra note 87, at 238, his opinions in Williams and Ballew examine sixth amendment
jury procedural standards and support a decrease in federal jury size. See 435 U.S. at 245
(White, J., concurring); 399 U.S. at 86. See also id. at 118 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting
that the Williams majority implies a lowering of federal jury standards). Justices Stevens and
Stewart have not fully committed themselves to either theory. Compare 435 U.S. at 245
(Stevens, J., concurring) (joining with Justice Blackmun who expressed his willingness to
balance state interest) with Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 633-38 (1976) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (federal jury standards applicable to the states); and compare Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. at 143 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (denouncing incorporationism) wvith Apo-
daca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 414 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (right to jury incorporated
with federal standards). Thus, the present Supreme Court is divided almost evenly between
Justices who would apply federal procedural standards to states whenever a right is incorpo-
rated through the fourteenth amendment and those who would allow the states to develop
their own procedures to effect such rights. See generally Cord, supra note 87, at 229-42.
12 See Cord, supra note 87, at 248 n.232.
'3 Based upon the Williams reasoning, the Supreme Court approved the use of six mem-
ber juries in federal civil cases. Colegrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973); see U.S. CONST.
amend. VII.
See Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976). In Ludwig, the Court held state
use of a two tiered trial system constitutional. Id. at 626-29. Such a procedure is unconstitu-
tional in federal courts. Id. at 629-30, citing Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888). The
majority in Ludwig justified the more stringent federal standards by interpreting the right
to jury provision of Article I, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution to require such a standard.
427 U.S. at 629-30. The dissenting Justices in Ludwig, however, argued that Callan was based
upon the sixth amendment and should have been followed. Id. at 634 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
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member federal juries." Because a majority of the Justices in Ballew was
unable to reach a consensus, it is still uncertain which approach to incor-
poration the Court will adopt." Ballew v. Georgia, therefore, simply
sets the minimum jury size at six" without providing any clear indication
of the implication for federal juries. The extent to which state juries
must conform to federal practice, 8 a major question posed by Duncan v.
Louisiana," is still unresolved.
PATRICIA A. VAN ALLAN
'5 In order to find that twelve member juries are required in federal criminal trials, the
Court would have to distinguish between the civil jury guarantee of the seventh amendment
and the criminal jury guarantee of the sixth amendment. When the Supreme Court held the
use of six member juries in federal civil courts constitutional, it relied upon the reasoning of
Williams. See Colegrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 158-60 (1973). The specific studies cited in
Colegrove, however, were criticized in Ballew. See 435 U.S. at 238-39, & nn.31 & 32. Further-
more, based upon the reasoning of Ludwig, the argument could be made that Article III,
section 2 of the U.S. Constitution imposes more stringent requirements on federal criminal
juries than on federal civil juries. See Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. at 629-30.
" Neither Ballew nor Williams involved federal juries.
435 U.S. at 228.
, See note 3 supra.
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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